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Abstract. Model checking is a widespread automatic formal analysis that has 
been successful in discovering flaws in security protocols. However existing 
possibilities for state space explosion still hinder analyses of complex protocols 
and protocol configurations. Message Inspection, is a technique that delimits 
the branching of the state space due to the intruder model without excluding 
possible attacks. In a preliminary simulation, the intruder model tags the 
eavesdropped messages with specific metadata that enable validation of 
feasibility of possible attack actions. The Message Inspection algorithm then 
decides based on these metadata, which attacks will certainly fail according to 
known security principles. Thus, it is a priori known that i.e. an encryption 
scheme attack cannot succeed if the intruder does not posses the right key in his 
knowledge. The simulation terminates with a report of the attack actions that 
can be safely removed, resulting in a model with a reduced state space. 
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1   Introduction 
Security analyses of existing cryptographic protocols have shown that protocols’ 
flaws can be revealed despite the cryptographic primitives used. While perfect 
encryptions by key-based cryptographic schemes or use of hash functions are 
considered techniques have been proved secure, the communication procedure may 
contain logical-based errors that can be exploited by an intruder model. In the related 
bibliography [1, 2] there are examples of protocols that were published with errors, 
which remained undiscovered for many years. Thus, formal ways of reasoning [3] for 
whether a given protocol meets its security goals is an absolute necessity. Model 
checking is a fully automatic analysis technique that has been successful in 
discovering flaws in communication protocols. However, ongoing research has not 
stopped to look for new ways to tackle the problem of state space explosion, which 
still prevents analyses of complex protocols and protocol configurations (e.g. higher 
bounds in the number of ongoing protocol sessions). 
In general-purpose model checking [4], state space explosion comes from the 
asynchronous composition of the modeled concurrent processes and the inherent 
symmetry redundancy of models in many different problem domains. Model checking 
security guarantees such as secrecy and authentication is based on the hardest possible 
assumptions for the dominance of the intruder over the communication between the 
protocol participants. These assumptions represent the general Dolev-Yao intruder 
model [5]: the intruder can intercept any message transmitted on a public 
communication channel and can also replace it with a message constructed from his 
initial knowledge and parts of the messages sent by the participants in the same or in 
other protocol sessions (intruder’s knowledge base). The new messages are created by 
applying one or more out of four (4) basic operations: encryption, decryption, 
concatenation and projection. Also, a typical Dolev-Yao intruder model includes 
additional assumptions, such as the un-breakability of the encryption used and the 
possibility the intruder to prevent an original message from reaching its destination. 
With the mentioned assumptions, any attempt to enumerate all possible attacks in 
all protocol steps results in an enormous branching of the state space. In the general 
case, for a given set of eavesdropped messages, the Dolev-Yao operations may be 
combined recursively, thus producing infinitely many possible fake messages. In 
explicit state model checking, analysts bound the size of fake messages, in order to set 
their models finite. However, memory space becomes crucial, due to the need to store 
information for each state, including the local states of all protocol participants and 
the accumulated knowledge of the intruder, for the protocol execution. 
In current article, we introduce the Message Inspection (MI) intruder model, which 
is essentially a Dolev-Yao style man-in-the-middle intruder based on the idea of 
improving his knowledge with protocol-specific metadata that provide information for 
the exchanged messages. In a preliminary simulation run, the intruder tags the 
eavesdropped messages with specific metadata parameters enabling him to validate 
all possible attack actions. The MI algorithm then decides based on this enhanced 
knowledge, which of the attacks will certainly fail and the simulation run terminates 
with a report of the attack actions that can be discarded. As a result, it is possible to 
improve the pruning of the state space by exploiting known security principles, 
formed as attack actions into the intruder’s structure. 
We provide a review of the mentioned approaches in Section 2. Section 3 presents 
the Message Inspection intruder model. The model structure is formally defined and 
subsequently we introduce the MI algorithm that decides, which attack actions will be 
performed against the analyzed protocol. In Section 4, we provide experimental 
results for a MI intruder model in the SPIN model checker [9], when compared with a 
generic Dolev-Yao intruder model applied upon the Needham Schroeder security 
protocol (NSPK) [10]. Finally, conclusions are discussed in Section 5.  
2.   Related Work 
In related bibliography, there are significant research contributions concerning uses, 
extensions and improvements of the Dolev-Yao intruder model. Many of these works 
[2, 11, 12, 13] provided a basis for integrating a custom user-specified intruder model 
into innovative model checking techniques for the analysis of security properties. 
One of the first systems that implemented the Dolev - Yao assumptions and the 
secrecy failure verification approach was the Interrogator tool [11]. Given a final state 
in which the intruder knows some message, which should be secret, the Interrogator 
tries all possible ways of constructing a path that reaches this particular state. If it 
finds such a path, then it has identified a security flaw. Finite state analysis of 
cryptographic protocols can take place in specialized security model checkers, like 
BRUTUS [6], where security violations are encoded as failures of secrecy or 
authentication. Alternatively, finite state analysis is often carried out in general-
purpose model checkers like Murφ [14] and the FDR (Failures Divergence 
Refinement) [15] model checker. When focused on the problem of the state space 
explosion, a series of interesting works exploit symmetry and partial order reduction 
techniques [6, 7, 14, 16]. In [8], the authors propose model checking with pre-
configuration, which is a divide-and-conquer method for verifying security protocols.  
Athena [17] builds on a different model representation, where in contrast to the 
conventional trace-based modeling approaches, a set of protocol runs that differ only 
in the order of interleaving executions of the individual participants is represented by 
only one state. This is achieved due to a clever extension to the strand space model 
representation. There is some form of symbolic reduction functionality, but Athena 
also allows the development of protocol-specific or general pruning theorems. 
Through this semi-automated approach the analyst uses theorems, in order to prune 
from the state space all states proved that do not contribute to the final result. 
To the best of our knowledge, the MI intruder model is the first model using 
message metadata collected from a preliminary simulation run. This data enhances the 
intruder’s knowledge with additional information regarding protocol behavior facts 
that in some cases cannot be observed dynamically across the explored state space 
paths. It is thus possible to improve the pruning of the state space by exploiting 
known security principles. Given the intruder’s knowledge for the protocol execution, 
these principles allow determining in advance, whether an attack action can or cannot 
cause a security violation. We know, for example, that an encryption scheme attack 
cannot succeed, if the intruder does not possess the right key in his knowledge. 
Consequently, encrypted messages can be treated differently from plain text or 
partially encrypted messages and an obvious optimization is to remove from the 
general Dolev - Yao model all attack actions, for which it is a priori known that they 
cannot succeed. Attack actions that can be removed are encoded into an open-ended 
base of primitive attacks (message replays, integrity violations, parallel session 
attacks and type-flaw attacks) that have been formalized in [18]. 
3   The Message Inspection Intruder Model 
This section introduces the MI intruder model and describes its use throughout the 
preliminary simulation run and the model checking phase. In order to formally 
describe the proposed approach, we use the formal notation initially specified in [18]. 
The model can be considered as an optimization approach, where message inspection 
(MI) reduces the search tree, without excluding any attacks that the analyst needs to 
check. It is based on a symbolic representation that avoids explicit enumeration of the 
messages that the intruder can generate from Iknowledge. Instead of using the Dolev-Yao 
deduction rules for inferring all possible fake messages in each protocol step, the MI 
intruder model records the eavesdropped messages in a preliminary simulation run 
and at the same time creates discrete metadata values for each recorded message. In 
this way, the intruder model manipulates only the metadata that were initially created 
and not the messages themselves. MΙ rules that will be introduced later determine 
which attack actions are appropriate and must be included in the intruder model for 
the model checking phase and which are not. Thus, the analyst can use MΙ, in order to 
prune the states found to be irrelevant according to the used MI rules. 
For the case shown in Figure 1, the MI intruder model acts as a man-in-the-
middle attacker that dominates the communication between honest agents A and B, by 
eavesdropping the exchanged messages. Each message is evaluated by message 
characterization mechanisms called metadata functions, in order to create appropriate 
metadata values that enhance the intruder’s knowledge for this specific message. The 
intruder model then consults the embedded base of attack actions, in order to decide 
which of them can be deactivated by the analyst, without excluding any attacks that 
may reveal a protocol security flaw. The analyst then proceeds to the model checking 
phase (2nd protocol execution) with the altered intruder model. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Message Inspection intruder model 
 
Let us consider a protocol PR between participating agents A, B,...,Z є Agents 
and let z representing the number of protocol steps. We simulate PR for a bounded 
number of protocol sessions say n. We use the messages of the following table, in 
order to derive metadata for the intruder’s knowledge Iknowledge as: 
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with bamsg ,  representing a message sent at the a
th step of session b by some ag є 
Agents. The intruder model stores metadata for each message shown in (1). The 
stored metadata values for some message sent at the ath step of session b, are derived 
by a parametric metadata function p(a,b) that is defined as follows. 
Definition 1. p(a,b) is a Κth parametric metadata function with Κ sub-functions, 
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where the value of p(msga,b)mtd, 1  mtd  Κ depends on the metadata attribute mtd 
being expressed (e.g. Encryption, Size etc.) for the specific message msga,bMsgs that 
is sent at the ath step of session b. 
Definition 1.1. The sub-function p(msga,b)Encryption of p(a,b) represents the readability 
of the intercepted message. The image of p(msga,b)Encryption is the set E={0, 1, 2}, where 
each value denotes one distinct case of encryption form: 0 is used for no encryption, 1 
for partial encryption and 2 for a fully encrypted message, 
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for some msguMsgs, kKeys and msgymsgz  ( ), i.e. at least one of the concatenated 
messages is not null. 
Based on the implemented MI function, the value of p(msga,b)mtd may represent 
e.g. the size of the message or whether the message is readable (plain text) or not. The 
following definitions instantiate MI for the specific metadata cases of the MI intruder 
model used in the model checking of the NSPK. 
MI enables the intruder model to act as a decision-making machine that groups 
attack actions into three different operational procedures corresponding to the 
symbolic values 0 for no encryption, 1 for partial encryption and 2 for full encryption. 
In this way, the MI intruder model implements the additional capability to select 
attack actions, for which according to known security principles – encoded as MI 
rules in Table 2 – it is a priori known that they will not succeed. For example, an 
encryption scheme attack will not uncover a protocol flaw, if the intruder does not 
possess the right key in Iknowledge. Instead of model checking a series of meaningless 
attacks, the MI algorithm informs the analyst for the possibility to correct his model 
by removing them. Thus the intruder model is simplified and in effect performs only 
the necessary attacks. Each attack action belongs to one of the broad categories of 
attacks, which were formalized in [18] as specific sequences of “send” and “receive” 
actions. 
Definition 1.2. The sub-function p(msga,b)Size of p(a,b) represents the message size in 
bits for some intercepted message. The image of this sub-function is some set of 
symbolic values S={s: s є  and s>0} with natural numbers representing valuations 
of the size of messages for the modelled protocol. 
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This specific sub-function enables the MI intruder model to track a message as a 
numeric valuation of its size, which in turn depends on the size valuations of its 
constituent parts. When the MI intruder detects two metadata values in different 
protocol sessions that correspond to messages of equal size, then according to [19] it 
is possible to mount a type flaw attack, irrespective of whether this attack will 
succeed or not. Furthermore, if the protocol is interrupted by some communication 
error and the intruder model stops receiving messages (timeout), then the size of the 
expected messages in all future steps of the same protocol session will be zero (0). In 
this case, the intruder model ignores the metadata values of this particular sub-
function for the undelivered messages.  
The columns of the table shown in (1) represent numbered steps in the simulated 
protocol sessions. These columns are seen as monotonically increasing sequences 
with positive integer terms bm є  and b0 = 1. The different terms can be considered 
as message timestamps that are set by the intruder model for the intercepted messages. 
They imply a relative message ordering that for two messages taken from the same or 
from interdependent protocol sessions may be used for checking whether one message 
precedes the other or not. As noted in related work, the applicability of some attack 
actions depends on the availability of intercepted message parts with timestamp 
values that are related in some way to the timestamp of the last intercepted message in 
the attacked protocol session. For example, an impersonation attack between two 
parallel sessions cannot – according to [19] and [20] – reuse message parts, with 
timestamp values greater than the timestamp value of the last intercepted message in 
the attacked protocol session. If necessary, the MI intruder model can integrate 
additional metadata sub-functions besides those mentioned. After having defined all 
metadata sub-functions, we define now the Intruder Knowledge Table [Ikt] as 
follows: 
Definition 2. In a MI intruder model we define the intruder knowledge table [Ikt], 
which is populated with the values of a parametric metadata function p(a,b) for all 
intercepted messages bamsg , , with (a,b)  [1..z][1..n]: 
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for some set of symbolic values S={s: s є  and s>0} with natural numbers and some 
msgu Msgs, kKeys and msgymsgz  ( ). The properties of [Ikt] are: 
 if bamsg ,  is never sent (null) then p(a,b)=0 and this means that the intruder 
has not intercepted any message sent in the ath protocol step of session b 
 if p(a,b)=0 then p(a+φ, b)=0 φ: a+φ z 
The properties of the [Ikt] table enable manipulation of the collected metadata 
values, for deriving protocol-specific model checking improvements like for example 
a state space reduction, through simplification of the applied intruder model. For a 
protocol PR and an intercepted message in protocol step a of session b the intruder 
model fills in the metadata values p(a, b). If a < z, then all table entries p(a+φ, b) with 
φ: a+φ z keep their initial value, which is zero (0), until the intruder intercepts 
the respective message. If for some reason, the protocol session is stopped, then the 
values of p(a+φ, b) remain zero.  
Definition 3. In order to compare two different [Ikt] table entries, say p(a, b) and p(c, 
d), such that ac  bd, we define the following operator: p(a, b)  p(c, d), iff 
 KdcKbadcbadcba msgpmsgpmsgpmsgpmsgpmsgp )()(...)()()()( ,,2,2,1,1,   
In the preliminary simulation run, the intruder’s knowledge is enhanced with the 
metadata of the [Ikt] table. The intruder’s knowledge then includes the information 
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model acts as a passive model entity, i.e. it does not execute “send” actions against 
honest participants. The performed simulation applies the MI algorithm to the updated 
Iknowledge and enables the intruder model to manipulate the message sequences 
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 for all agAgents based on the [Ikt] table. The obtained 
simulation output may include a list of attack actions that can be safely removed from 
the MI intruder model. 
Figure 2 introduces the two phases of the MI algorithm. We consider agents A, B є 
Agents that exchange messages according to process descriptions PI and PR with the 
actions performed in the roles of the initiator and the responder for some protocol, say 
PR. The intruder model acts as a man-in-the-middle entity that captures all messages 
exchanged between protocol participants. For each intercepted message, the intruder 
model creates a structure p(a, b) corresponding to the [Ikt] table entry for the ath step 
of session b, as shown in Figure 2. The metadata values in the p(a, b) structures are 
used for comparing the intercepted protocol messages, in order to select the applicable 
attack actions. 
Let us consider that protocol PR has four (4) steps and runs in two sessions. In the 
MI initialization phase, the intruder model records all intercepted messages from the 
two protocol sessions. The number of fields in the created structures p(a,b) is the 
number of metadata sub-functions that are implemented. When the MI intruder 
intercepts a message, it updates the respective [Ikt] table entry, which is used for 
comparing it – by applying operator  as defined in definition 3 – with the table 
entries of previous rows or if the message is part of the second session, with the table 
entries of the first column. Each comparison determines if there are attack actions that 
according to the MI rules of Table 2 can be safely excluded, in the examined protocol 
step. Attack actions that do not contribute in the model checking for all protocol steps 
are reported in the produced simulation output and it is then possible to remove them 
from the MI intruder model. The analyst also removes the MI initialization part and 
proceeds to the model checking of the security guarantees of interest, with the 
optimized MI intruder model that generates a reduced state space. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The MI algorithm and the attack actions for the MI intruder model 
 
Figure 2 also shows the open-ended base of attack actions that in the current 
implementation of the MI intruder model are checked for their feasibility.  
 
Table 1. Attack actions of the MI intruder model and how they are related to the meta-data 
entries of the [Ikt] table 
Attack Action Action description 
A1 Select an intercepted message and send it to its sender (A1_2) or to its 
intended recipient (A1_3) or to some participant that is neither the 
intended recipient nor the sender (A1_1)  
A2 Replace an intercepted message with another message or produce a fake 
message by concatenation with some message from Iknowledge  
A3  Replace a (part of an) intercepted message that corresponds to some p(a,b) 
with a previously intercepted message (part) 
A4 Impersonate some ag  Agents using a previously intercepted message that 
corresponds to some p(a,b) with a=1 
A5 Initiate a new protocol session or manipulate an existing session using a 
previously intercepted message that corresponds to some p(a,b) 
 
The selected attack actions appear as primitive steps in attacks reported in the 
related bibliography and have been proposed in published taxonomies [20, 21] that 
formalize the observations of intruder misbehaviors, where the intruder redirects 
messages among protocol participants. In [18], we provided formal definitions of the 
selected primitive attack actions, as well as bibliographic examples, where these 
attack actions violate security properties of existing protocols. 
Table 1 introduces textual descriptions of the sequences of “send” and “receive” 
actions for the attack actions of Figure 3, as well as how these actions are related to 
the meta-data entries of the [Ikt] table. Attack actions A1 represent the sending of an 
intercepted or (if combined with another attack action) a counterfeited message, either 
to its original sender or to its intended recipient or even to some participant that is 
neither the intended recipient nor the sender. The metadata values p(a, b) do not 
influence the feasibility of this general attack action. However, we adopt the 
assumption that if the sent fake message does no comply with the pattern of the 
message expected by the “victim”, then the recipient falls into a fail-stop state, i.e. he 
does not continue with the ongoing protocol execution. This assumption represents 
the expected behavior of a correct protocol implementation. 
Attack action A2, when feasible, alters an intercepted message by replacing it or 
part of it with some message from Iknowledge. This is possible only when 
p(msgα,b)Encryption is 0 or 1. If p(msgα,b)Encryption=2 and the intruder does not have in 
Iknowledge the right key for decrypting the intercepted message, then the contents of the 
message cannot be read (un-breakability of the encryption used) and the A2 attack 
action is not possible. 
 
Table 2. Rules for checking feasibility of attack actions for MI intruder model 
Metadata  Enabling conditions Attack Actions 
p(msga,b)Encryption=  2 A1, A4, A5 
p(msga,b)Encryption=  1 A1, A2, A4, A5 
p(msga,b)Encryption 2 and  
 mMsgs: exists(m, msga,b) = true and 
 amsg  AMsgs  Iknowledge: 
p(amsg)Size=p(m)Size 
A3 
Readability p(msga,b)Encryption  
p(msga,b)Encryption=  0 A1, A2, A4, A5 
Size s1 = p(msga,b)Size and  
s2 = p(msgc,d)Size 
s1 = s2 and a < c b = d A3 
 
Attack action A3 replaces a part of an intercepted message or the whole message, 
with another message from Iknowledge. The produced fake message can be accepted by 
the “victim”, only if its size is the same with the size of the expected message. This 
can be checked by appropriate comparisons of stored metadata values for the 
messages in Iknowledge. Type flaws with partially altered messages are possible only 
when p(msgα,b)Encryption is not 2, i.e. when the intercepted message is (partially) 
readable. Alternatively, according to [20], a type flaw attack is also possible, when in 
a protocol session an honest agent falls into misinterpretation of a received message, 
supposed to deliver specific data in some protocol step. This type flaw attack is an 
open possibility even when the used intercepted message is fully encrypted and the 
intruder does not possess in Iknowledge the key needed to decrypt it.  
Attack action A4 initiates a new protocol session be reusing a previously 
intercepted message that corresponds to some p(a,b) with a =1. Finally, attack action 
A5 initiates a new protocol session or manipulates an existing session by reusing a 
previously intercepted message. Both A4 and A5 are not based on specific 
requirements for the encryption form of the intercepted message. 
Table 2 introduces the MI rules for checking feasibility of attack actions in the 
first implementation of the MI intruder model. The enabling conditions are used in 
metadata comparisons like the ones described in next paragraphs, in order to 
determine whether an attack action is feasible or not. Attack actions that in all 
protocol steps are not feasible can be safely removed, thus yielding an optimized 
intruder model for the analyzed protocol. The metadata sub-function p(msga,b)Encryption 
plays an important role in this analysis, since its values determine whether the 
intercepted message msga,b can or cannot be read. When msga,b is fully encrypted 
(p(msga,b)Encryption=2), the intruder model checks in Iknowledge if it owns the key needed 
to decrypt the intercepted message. If the key is found, this message is marked as non-
encrypted and the metadata value p(msga,b)Encryption=0 is recorded in the corresponding 
field of p(a,b). If it is possible to read only some part of the intercepted message 
msga,b then p(msga,b)Encryption=1, i.e. msga,b is partially encrypted. This is a sufficient 
condition for enabling attack actions A1, A2, A4 and A5. Moreover, the possibility to 
replace a part of the message, say m, with some atomic message amsg from Iknowledge 
requires equal metadata values for p(amsg)Size and p(m)Size. This enabling condition 
implements the requirement for making an agent vulnerable to misinterpret some part 
of the message (attack action A3), which is its size.  In most cases, p(msga,b)Encryption 
will be 2, which automatically excludes the possibility of an integrity violation (attack 
action A2) that requires read access to some part of the intercepted message. As we 
already noted, in type flaw attacks where the intercepted message is replaced as a 
whole, there is no special requirement for its encryption form. If the expected 
message has the same size with an intercepted message from a previous step of the 
same protocol session [20], then it is possible for the intruder to mount a type flaw 
attack. In the last row of Table 2 we provide the enabling conditions for this attack 
action. For a complete description of the attack actions mentioned in Table 2 the 
reader is referred to [18].  
For all attack actions of Table 1, the intruder model compares the metadata 
values of the intercepted messages and if an attack action is possible, the model 
indicates the feasibility of the examined attack action.  
 
 
Fig. 4: Comparisons of the [Ikt] table entries for detecting possible attack actions 
 
Examples of the comparisons made for the considered 4-step protocol are shown 
in Figure 4, for most of the mentioned attack actions. When p(1,1)  p(1,2) and at the 
same time holds for these two table entries one of the conditions of Table 2 that 
enable attack actions A4 and/or A5, then the MI intruder model can initiate a new 
protocol session, in order to attempt a parallel session or an impersonation attack. 
When p(2,1)  p(2,2) and for these two table entries hold the conditions of Table 2 
that enable attack action A5, then it is possible the MI intruder to manipulate an 
existing parallel session for an attack, that may subvert one of the protocol’s 
correctness properties. When p(a,b)  p(c,b) and for these two table entries hold the 
conditions of Table 2 that enable attack actions A1, then it is possible the MI intruder 
to perform a deflection or a reflection message replay. Finally, when p(a,b)  p(c,d) 
for two messages in different protocol sessions, the last intercepted message is 
(partially) readable and at the same time hold the conditions shown in Table 2, then it 
is possible the MI intruder to perform a type-flaw attack action. 
In that case I trigger the attack, possibly after having altered the eavesdropped 
msg  Msgs based on Iknowledge, thus resulting in a msg΄  Msgs. The subsequent 
action performed by I is either send (I, v, msg΄) or send (I, v, {msg΄}k΄) for a k΄ 
Iknowledge such that v  is_key_of (k΄), i.e. v is the owner of k΄. This attack action 
succeeds, if in the global state after the occurrence of the action receive (v, I, msg΄) or 
respectively receive (v, I, {msg΄}k΄) there is some atomic message amsg, such that 
exists(amsg, noSesv ircvd )max( ) = true, 1  noSes  #Sesv and for two sets Sete and Setf 
from the “disjoint” union Amsgs, amsg  Sete  Setf where i  1 represent the terms 
of the concatenation sequence of messages received by agent v in the course of 
session noSes. Thus, an atomic message that was originally intended to have one type 
(e.g. nonce) is interpreted as having another type (e.g. key or data) meaning that the 
type flaw is exploited, even though this may not lead to a direct security compromise. 
During model checking, the MI intruder model performs all possible attack actions 
in all protocol steps, after having excluded - as a result of the preliminary simulation 
run - the attack actions whose enabling conditions are not satisfied in all protocol 
steps. The honest agents   Agents either accept or reject the fake messages based 
on the implemented protocol logic. In essence, the metadata in the [Ikt] table store 
protocol-specific monitoring information, which is used in controlling the behavior of 
the MI intruder model in an effective way.  
5   MI-based model checking of the NSPK protocol 
The NSPK protocol aims to establish mutual authentication between the initiator 
and the responder, in order to start a message exchange between them. The protocol 
name suggests the use of public key cryptography, for delivering authentication 
guarantees. The reduced version of the NSPK protocol, shown in Figure 6, includes 
only three (3) protocol steps, where in each step the protocol participants A (for the 
initiator) and B (for the responder) exchange messages with agent identities and 
randomly generated nonces (NA, NB), encrypted by the public keys PK{A} and PK{B}. 
The sent information can be checked by the receivers.  
The reported results concern with two different intruder models, i.e. the general 
Dolev-Yao intruder with the deduction rules specified in [5] and an MI intruder 
model. Honest agents are encoded as fail-stop processes, i.e. if the message received 
in a protocol step is not the expected one, then protocol execution is stopped for the 
receiver even though the provided security guarantees have not been violated. 
Potential failures of message secrecy or failures of authentication are expressed as 
invalid end-states in the SPIN model checking environment.  
In a preliminary simulation run with two protocol sessions (Figure 6), the MI 
intruder model detected two attack actions, namely A2 and A3 that can be safely 
removed. More specifically, the MI intruder acts as a man-in-the-middle entity 
between agents A and B for the first protocol session and B and C for the second 
session.  Upon intercepting an NSPK message, say msga,b, the MI model creates 
appropriate metadata values for p(msga,b)Encryption and p(msga,b)Size that are recorded in 
[Ikt] table (Figure 6i). Since the MI intruder forwards the sent messages to the 
intended recipients, both protocol sessions are completed with success. We realize 
that all protocol messages are fully encrypted and since the decryption key is never 
included in Ιknowledge, for all metadata values p(msga,b)Encryption is 2. We also see the 
metadata values computed for p(msga,b)Size, for the message sizes shown in Figure 6, 
representing the assumption that there are no two size-similar atomic messages, with 
the first message being an agent identity and the second one coming from the set of 
nonces.   
The MI intruder model then performs (Figure 6ii) the metadata comparisons 
discussed in section 4.2 by taking into account the MI rules of Table 2. Finally, the 
intruder model outputs the decisions made (Figure 6iii). Since p(msga,b)Encryption = 2 in 
all protocol steps, the integrity violation attack action (A2) is excluded. Also, because 
p(msga,b)Encryption= 2 for all exchanged messages and at the same time there are no 
size-similar messages in the same protocol session, the MI-based intruder model 
proposes removing the type flaw attack action (A3).  
 
 
Fig. 6. Preliminary MI simulation run: the intruder (i) creates the [Ikt] table, (ii) compares the 
metadata and (iii) proposes removal of attack actions A2 and A3 
Figure 7a provides the model checking result for the described NSPK model, 
when using the optimized MI intruder and the partial order reduction functionality of 
the SPIN model checker. An invalid end state is reached at depth 25 of the produced 
reachability graph and the search is stopped after having detected the reported error. 
A subsequent guided simulation explores the generated counterexample and creates 
the message sequence diagram of Figure 7b. The reached invalid end state 
corresponds to the state, where agent B acting as responder accepts a fake NSPK 
message that causes him to initiate a new protocol session. The used message is 
created by the intruder model in the role of the initiator according to the message 
pattern of the first of the three messages shown in Figure 6. This invalid 
authentication in effect causes a successful impersonation attack against B, who 
perceives the intruder as an honest protocol participant. The same security violation 
has been also detected with a generic Dolev-Yao intruder model, but in that case the 
reached depth of the detected invalid end state was 48. The compared objects are the 
state spaces produced for the two intruder models where we compare the size of the 
spaces generated up to the point of having detected the error (shown in Figure 8). 
Obviously, the size reduction achieved by the optimized MI intruder model in 
this case is orders of magnitude less than the size reduction achieved in the 
aforementioned more general case. The default working mode of the SPIN model 
checker includes the partial order and symmetry reduction functionality. However, in 
order to explore the interactions of the two intruder models with additional reduction 
and state exploration options of SPIN, we also report search space techniques 
produced in other error exploration modes (DFS and BFS search modes). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7a. Verification output for NSPK with the 
detected invalid end state at depth 25 
Fig. 7b. Guided simulation of counter- 
example with the detected impersonation 
While SPIN uses by default partial order reduction technique [9] among with a 
DFS search, we can disable the specific feature or alter the search algorithm (from 
DFS to BFS search). The main advantage of the BFS search option - which is 
effective only for safety properties (secrecy and authentication) - is that it finds the 
shortest path to an error state, while the DFS search often finds a longer path. Figure 
8, provides results for the state spaces generated up to the point of having detected the 
invalid end state. The NSPK protocol model with the Dolev-Yao intruder model 
generated state spaces with about 2.5 times the number of stored unique states for the 
MI intruder. An interesting observation is that this improvement depends on the depth 
where the error is discovered and from this point of view the Breadth-First Search 
finds the shortest path to the error. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Size of the state spaces for the NSPK security flaw with the optimized MI intruder 
model (MI) and the general Dolev-Yao intruder model (DY) 
 
While in Figure 7a (MI intruder with Depth-First Search) the error was detected 
at depth 25 (1.4103 hash collisions in a hash table with 264 stored unique states), 
when using Breadth-First Search the error was discovered at depth 5 (no hash 
collisions in a hash table with 112 unique states). On the other hand, when verifying 
NSPK with the Dolev-Yao intruder model and Depth-First Search the error is 
detected at depth 48 resulting in 7.3104 collisions in a table with 698 stored states.  
6.   Conclusion 
The MI intruder model aims to restrict the inherent combinatorial complexity of 
security model checking with intruder models that adopt the general Dolev-Yao rules. 
This is achieved through message inspection that allows customizing the intruder 
behavior, by taking into account protocol specific metadata for the structure and the 
characteristics of the exchanged messages. The described modeling approach does not 
exclude other state space pruning techniques. The only requirement is that it can be 
implemented only in model checking environments that support both simulation and 
model checking of the analyzed security protocol. We conducted a series of 
experiments for exploring the improvements in the model checking of the NSPK 
protocol, when compared with the generic Dolev-Yao intruder model. 
The MI intruder model provides an open-ended framework for integrating 
additional protocol-specific model checking optimizations. For a potential extension 
concerning insertion of feasibility check for a new attack action the analyst will have 
to implement additional MI rules and metadata comparisons. If necessary, the model 
may be extended by including additional metadata parameters, but this will cause 
modifications in the MI initialization code that stores metadata values for the 
intercepted messages in the [Ikt] table. A future goal is the design of an integrated 
modeling environment that will provide the described functionality in a usable model 
checking package. 
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